_Posted on June 07, 2024_ The first few words of this chapter identify what Aristotle is studying in this work: > Of things discoursed upon > (1a16) Now, "things discoursed upon" are those things which are transferrable from mind to mind via language. This implies that we are to discuss _ideas_ as such. In Aristotle's De Anima, he writes about ideas as they inhabit the human mind. In this regard, ideas are viewed as the mind taking on the form of an object of thought. We can manipulate these "objects of thought," virtually establishing new relations which form new ideas. > some are enunciated after a complex, others after an incomplex, manner; the complex as "a man runs," "a man conquers," but the incomplex as "man," "ox," "runs," "conquers." > (1a16-20) This is saying that some ideas are expressed in complex ways, while others are expressed in incomplex ways. The ensuing examples help us understand what is meant by 'complex' and 'incomplex'. "A man runs" is identified as complex in contrast to "man," and "runs". In this way we identify complex _expressions_ as an expression which _relates_ multiple ideas. "man" and "runs" are atomic ideas, while "a man runs" is a related compounding of the two atomic, incomplex ideas. >Likewise also some things are predicated of a certain subject, yet are in no subject, as "the man" is predicated of a subject, i.e. of "some certain man," yet is in no subject. >(1a20-24) Here we see some terminology which was introduced in [[Categories, Chapter 1|chapter 1]]. That is, we introduced what it means for a thing to be predicated of a subject. However, it is not immediately specified what is meant by a thing being "in no subject". Later in this chapter, Aristotle provides a definition of its complement: > I mean by a thing being in a subject, that which is in any thing not as a part, but which cannot subsist without that in which it is > (1a24-25) To understand this, we must remember that we are considering things as ideas. Additionally, recall that a subject is what a statement is about, or the thing under consideration in a statement. According to this passage, for an idea to be _in_ a subject is for the idea to be 1) "that which is in any thing not as part", and 2) "that which... cannot subsist without that in which it is". 1) Implies that the idea is _in_ the subject, or imbued within the subject, while not being a fundamental part of the subject itself. I.e. the subject would still be of the same _kind_ if it were not imbued with this idea. Here, Aristotle is also removing ambiguity, as 'in' is a [[Categories, Chapter 1|hymonymous]] term. It _could_ mean that the idea is in something as a part (e.g. my eye is a part of me), but Aristotle clarifies that it does not. In contrast, 2) implies that the idea would not continue on _in being_ without the subject in which it is imbued. I.e. it relies on the subject for its existence. An idea fitting this definition I would typically call a property or a quality of the subject. Thus, for an idea (or thing) to be in a subject is for it to be a property of that subject. Thus, something which is "predicated of a certain subject, yet... [is] in no subject" is something which can be the _kind_ of a subject, but cannot be a _property_ of a subject. The example here fits this interpretation. I.e. "the man" is a kind of thing, while it cannot be a property of a thing. Another key word in this sentence is the word "likewise". Indicating that this is indeed an extension of the ideas presented before. Aristotle has extended the idea of complex and incomplex enunciations to also encompass how these ideas relate to subjects in terms of predication and existential dependencies. This is an examination of the _structure_ of ideas as they relate to one another ontologically. Aristotle continues with another such categorization of ideas: > Others, again, are in a subject, yet are not predicated of any subject > (1a26) This would be those ideas which are properties of things, but are not kinds of things. > as "a certain grammatical art" is in a subject, "the soul," but is not predicated of any; and "this white thing" is in a subject, "the body," (for all "colour" is in "body,") but is predicated of no subject. > (1a27-30) In De Anima, Aristotle introduces the soul as containing our intellect. Aristotle identifies that this is what makes our soul distinct from that of an animal. Indeed, this is typically ascribed by theologians as the key component as what makes humans _be_ in the _imago Dei_, or image of God (Genesis 1:27). Thus, for "a certain grammatical art" to be in "the soul" means that the reasoning capabilities of a certain man have the property of "a certain grammatical art". Obviously, "a certain grammatical art" is not a type of thing (it is a particular thing). An idea cannot _be_ "a certain grammatical art", and so it is "predicated of no subject". >But some things are both predicated of and are in a subject, as "science" is in a subject—"the soul," but is predicated of a subject, namely, "grammar." >(1a30-35) "Science" is something _in_ the soul, a property of our intellect. Yet, "grammar" _is_ a science. Science is the kind of thing grammar is. Thus, "science" can be predicated of a subject (grammar), and science is in a subject (soul). > Lastly, some are neither in, nor are predicated of, any subject, as "a certain man" and "a certain horse," for nothing of this sort is either in, or individuals predicated of, a certain subject. In short, individuals, and whatever is one in number, are predicated of no subject, but nothing prevents some of them from being in a subject, for "a certain grammatical art" is amongst those things which are in a subject, but is not predicated of any subject. > (1a35-1b10) "A certain man" is clearly a certain thing, a definite thing, which no other thing can _be_. Thus, it cannot be that it is a type of thing, and so can not be predicated of any thing. Indeed, any thing which no other thing can be cannot be predicated of another subject. These things Aristotle calls individuals. Additionally, "a certain man" is not a property, "a certain man" exists independently and so subsists without being in anything else. Thus, "a certain man" cannot be in any subject. Though clearly many individuals are not in any subject, Aristotle also notes with an example that individuals may still be in other subjects. They can be individual while incapable of independence. Aristotle has established four categories of "things discoursed upon" based on the way they linguistically relate. We may think of these linguistic relations as pointing towards ontological distinctions. These distinct linguistic relations are defined according to differences in two ways of relating things in expression. I.e. as a thing being predicated of a subject, and a thing being in a subject.