Aristotle’s Categories: Chapter 1

Aristotle begins the categories by introducing a few terms which relate “things” in the world to the language we use to describe them. Though not explicitly stated, there seems to be a key principle at play. This principle suggests that we refer to things by certain names because those names correspond to a particular definition or essence that the thing satisfies.

First, homonymity is introduced:

Things are termed homonymous, of which the name alone is common, but the definition (of substance according to the name) is different; (1a1–2)

To me, the statement “Things are termed homonymous” was initially confusing. My initial thought was that Aristotle was classifying things as homonymous in relation to one another (e.g. thing $X$ is homonymous to thing $Y$), or that we term things as homonymous (e.g. thing $X$ is homonymous). However, these classifications alone are incompatible with the example given below. To understand this, we take “termed homonymous” to be a sort of action in regard to things under consideration. When a thing is termed homonymous, this means that we apply a term to the thing homonymously, thus establishing a special relation between the thing and its term. In this sense, homonymous is not a property of a thing considered on its own (as I initially thought). Rather, it is a property of the relation between a term and the things it may refer to (thus, homonymy is inseparable from language). To term things homonymous, they must share a common “name” while having different definitions, or, equivalently, a different “substance according to the name”. To illustrate this concept, Aristotle provides an example, which initially seems rather nonsensical:

thus “man” and “the picture of a man” are each termed “animal,” since of these, the name alone is common, but the definition (of the substance according to the name) is different: as if any one were to assign what was in either, to constitute it “animal,” he would allege the peculiar definition of each. (1a3-5)

The confusion seems to stem from the English translation: In what sense can “the picture of a man” be termed ‘animal’? Looking at the ancient Greek word ζῷον, which is translated here as animal, this example becomes much more clear (it is sensible that in this case confusion would arise from translation into another language, given the topic being discussed). Ζῷον may be translated as either animal or image. Thus, “man” and “the picture of a man” can both be termed ζῷον but have different substances according to this term. “Man” as animal, and “the picture of a man” as image. So, they share the name ζῷον while having different substances in accordance with this name (definitions). This clearly matches the above requirements for things which are termed homonymous.

Essentially, Aristotle has demonstrated that our tendency to categorize things according to the language we use to describe them can lead to imprecision. Though it is natural for us to categorize different things under a common name, there are many instances where the name changes meaning, depending on the thing being named. As a modern example, “chip” can refer to both a deep-fried potato slice, or a computer component. Here, to use “chip” (or any homonym) as an ontological foundation will not serve us well, as there is no common notion of what this means. The “substance” is obscured by the name.

Next, synonyms are introduced:

But those are called synonyms, of which both the name is common, and the definition (of the substance according to the name) is the same (1a6-7)

Again, the translation here is rather convoluted. We should not consider the thing as a synonym, but refer to the things as being “termed synonymous” i.e. applying a term (i.e. synonym) to the things synonymously.

Specifically, things which are “termed synonymous” have a common name, while their “substance according to the name” is also common. Here, the substance as being “according to the name” is essential to note. This means that when things are termed synonymous (according to a particular synonym), they express a common particular definition of the synonym. Therefore, in contrast to homonyms, synonyms are grounded in an ontological unity.

both “a man” and “an ox” are “animal,” for each of these is predicated of as “animal” by a common name, and the definition of the substance is the same, since if a man gave the reason of each as to what was in either, to constitute it “animal,” he would assign the same reason. (1a8-12)

We see that “a man” and “an ox” are not the same thing, but are of the same substance, in accordance with the name ‘animal’. They are both ‘animal’ for the same reason.

As a sidenote, Aristotle has also introduced a new concept here. He states that “a man” and “an ox” are “predicated of as ‘animal’ by a common name”. In chapter two, a thing being “predicated of” a subject is used again without definition. Fundamentally, predication is what a statement says about its subject. A subject, in turn, is what a statement is about. Being predicated of a subject is when the predicate identifies the kind of thing the subject is. So “a man” and “an ox” being “predicated of as ‘animal’” simply means that when referred to as ‘animal’, “a man” and “an ox” are both being referred to as the same kind of thing (animal). This contrasts with “a man” and “a picture of a man” both being referred to as ζῷον, while having different “substance according to the name”, i.e. being different kinds of things.

Interestingly, things termed synonymous are horizontally related under some common ‘name’ whose definition captures something more general. This is clear in the example, as there is no direct hierarchical relationship between “a man” and “an ox”, while still both are animals. Next, Aristotle introduces paronyms, which in contrast to synonyms necessarily capture direct hierarchical relations:

Again, things are called paronyms which, though differing in case, have their appellation (according to name) from some thing, as “a grammarian” is called so from “grammar,” and “a courageous man” from “courage.” (1a12-15)

Again, it makes sense to consider that a thing can be “termed paronymous”, so that it can be given a name (i.e. a paronym) which is derived from the name of some other thing. In this case, the language points to necessary ontological antecedence of the thing whose name is appelled. That is, the thing whose name is appelled (e.g. grammar) must exist prior to the thing which is termed paronymous (e.g. a grammarian). This is then an early insight into the more broad idea of ontological priority.

As established above, things termed synonymous are horizontally situated under some unifying generality. Importantly, the nature of the relationship to this unifying generality is as a genus, establishing the kind of thing some thing is. In contrast, the nature of the hierarchical relationship established by paronyms is more restricted. Specifically, it only implies ontological antecedence of the thing whose name is appelled (as the things “differ… in case”).